Illinois Wesleyan University

Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects

Political Science Department

5-13-1994

The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade and the Next
Tier: The Right to Access
Thomas Wayne Gaylord '94
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Gaylord '94, Thomas Wayne, "The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade and the Next
Tier: The Right to Access" (1994). Honors Projects. 24.
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj/24

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

-

..

The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade
and the Next Tier: The Right to Access

Thomas Wayne Gaylord
Political Science
Research Honors-Final Revised Edition
Dr. Robert Leh
05/13/94

•
Table

of Contents

Introduction
Part I-Abortion Law from Griswold to Casey
Chapter 1. The Foundation of the Rights to Privacy and
Abortion
A. The Right to Privacy
B. The Right to an Abortion
Chapter 2. The Abortion Choice Issues Since Roe
A. State- and Federal-Funding
B. Parental Notification/Consent
C. Mandatory Waiting Periods
D. Informed Consent Laws
E. Mandatory Procedures
F. Miscellaneous Provisions
Conclusion-Part I
Part II-The Right to Clinic Access
Chapter 3. Access Denied: The Failure of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871
Chapter 4. Access Envisioned: The Victory? of RICO
Conclusion-Part II
Conclusion

•
2

Since the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,
abortion has occupied a lot of the Court's time and energy. Beyond
the legalization of the procedure, the Court has had to wrestle with
several related issues, as well. Ranging from parental consent laws
to waiting periods, from state- and federal-funding denials to
procedural regulations, the Court has ruled on many abortion-related
issues, most of them more than three times. Although most of these
issues were ruled on in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania·v. Casey (1992), the Court's invocation of the "undue

burden" test will probably cause the Court as many headaches as did
Roe's "trimester fraIllework."

The aIllbiguity of Roe's trimester fraIllework," a guideline
11

designed to set limits on state infringement on the right to choose an
abortion, caused much of the litigation since. Unlike a judicial "test",
which is designed to gauge the constitutionality of statutes as they
come before the Court, the legislative nature of the "trimester
fraIllework" seemingly was designed to limit, not promote, future
litigation on the subject. The "trimester fraIllework"'s aIllbiguity
prevented this from occurring.
The "undue burden" test will do the SaIlle. It is a classic
example of judicial doctrine aimed at defIDing a limit past which a
statute may not advance. However, no limit is defmed by the "undue
burden" test, only the sorry explanation that a state may not impose
an "undue burden" on the woman's right to abort. Such aIllbiguity
can accomplish nothing but more litigation as states such as Missouri
and Louisiana and Ohio (states always seemingly at the forefront of
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anti-choice legislation) scramble to write legislation testing what the
limits on "undue burdens" might be.
In the meantime, the Court has moved on to a new volatile

issue, access to clinics where abortions are provided. The scene
displayed in Wichita, Kansas in the summer of 1991, massive
protests with little recourse but to jail those protesting to keep clinic
doors open, and repeated across the nation, has led to enormous
amounts of litigation in the federal court system as pro-choice groups
attempt to scale back the threat to clinic access by these "rescues."
An ill-depth probe of the Court's decision in N.O.l1t: v. Scheidler

(114 S. Ct. 798; 1994), along with the future of RICO (the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970) claims in blockade cases, will
be discussed.. The future of RICO claims is apparently tenuous,
because of both the proof required to make a racketeering claim
against the activities of pro-life blockade groups, as well as the
probable First Amendment speech and assembly rights implications.
The ambiguity of the "undue burden" test, along with the
tenuous nature of RICO claims and their basis in abortion clinic
blockade situations, has opened a new can of litigious worms for the
Supreme Court in the arena of abortion law.
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Part I-Abortion Law from Griswold to Casey
Chapter 1-The Foundat;ion of the Rights to Privacy and
Abortion
A. The Right to Privacy
Nowhere in the United States Constitution did the framers
specifically grant a right to privacy to the citizens of the United
States. In fact, not until the landmark 1965 Supreme Court decision
in Griswoli1 v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479) was such a right "found"
unambiguously to exist. In Griswold, the Court found that a
Connecticut law that outlawed the use of contraceptives between
married persons was violative of a "right to privacy" protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies most
of the original Bill of Rights to the states) and the Ninth Amendment,
which states, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." In other words, just because the Constitution does not
explicitly grant a right to privacy, that does not mean that one does
not exist.
The right to privacy was reaffirmed and broadened by the
Court's holding in the 1972 case Eisenstadtv. Baird. (405 U.S. 438).
Here, the Court ruled unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute
outlawing contraceptive distribution to unmarried persons.

5

B. The Right to an Abortion
Following the Court's rulings in Griswold (1965) and Eisenstadt
(1972), the Court, in Roe v.. Wadeand Doe v. Bolton (both 1973),
struck down Texas and Georgia criminal abortion statutes,
respectively. In Roe, the first of the companion cases, the Court
found a:
concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital,
. familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the
Bill of Rights... or among those rights reserved to the
people by the Ninth Aplendment (Roe, 410 U.S. 113).
The personal liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment, according to the
Court, included the right to reproductive choice, to a point. In
defending its statute, Texas argued that it had a "compelling state
interest" in outlawing abortion. In order for a state or the federal
government to disparage a liberty, it must demonstrate that an
overriding state interest exists. The Roe Court examined three
possible justifications for Texas's statute. The fIrst was to deter illicit
sex. The Court gave litt.l;e weight to this argument and spent little
space in the written decision deciding that no compelling state
interest in deterring illicit sex warranted a ban on abortion.
The second was the risk involved in the abortion procedure.
The Court noted that at the time most abortion statutes were
enacted, the procedure was very hazardous. However, the
advancement of medical technology, especially antiseptic techniques,
has made abortion during the first trimester as safe a procedure as
childbirth, if not safer. From the end of the first trimester through

-
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viability of the fetus (the time when it is capable of surviving outside
of the womb, roughly at the end of the second trimester when Roe
was written), abortion appears to be as safe (or as dangerous) as
childbirth. By the third trimester (post-viability), childbirth is
statistically safer than abortion. This reasoning, though not in itself
resulting in a compelling Interest, played a crucial role in what
became known as the "trimester framework" laid out in Roe.
The third possible justification for proscribing abortion
considered by the Court was the State's interest in protecting the
future life·of an unborn fetus. The State argued that its interest in
protecting "potential life" (a term used in Texas' statute) overrode
the right to privacy as it applies to abortion. This concept, too,
played a role in developing the trimester framework.
In what many consider the prime example of Court-made law,

the Roe Court manufactured the trimester framework which was to
gauge the constitutionality of future state statutes regarding
abortion. The Court argued that dUring the first trimester of
pregnancy, there was no compelling state interest overriding a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Therefore, a state may
place no restrictions on a first trimester abortion, other than that it
must be performed by a licensed physician (as would most other
medical procedures).
During the second trimester, when the abortion procedure
becomes riskier, the Court found that the state had a compelling
interest in safeguarding the health of the woman undertaking an
abortion. Hence, the state may pass regulations related to
guaranteeing the health and life of the woman, but not the fetus.
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These regulations, though not specifically outlined may include
regulating where an abortion mayor may not take place and the like.
At the point that the fetus becomes viable, the state's
compelling interest in preserving fetal life takes precedence over the
abortion right, except in cases of rape and where the life or health of
the woman would be jeopardized by carrying the fetus to term. With
these exceptions in place, a state may go so far as to ban all third
trimester abortions not meeting one of those criteria. It is apparent .
that in manufacturing the trimester framework, the Court took into
account both the risk associated with the abortion procedure as
compared with childbirth, as weUas the point at which the fetus
becomes viable (viability, in the Court's language, including the
capability of artificially-sustained life).
Many took umbrage at the Court's gall to reach such a broad
decision. Beyond the fact that Roe v. Wade overturned statutes in
almost every state, the fact that the Court seemed to stretch its
powers to the limit fazed many. With the Roe decision, the Court
seemingly rewrote the statutes passed by the legislatures of almost
every state. However, the Court's action in Roe is not all that unique.
The Court at times sees what it perceives as constitutional problems
that simply will not go away unless acted upon. For example,
another case in which the Court made a similar ruling was County of
Riverside v. Mclaughlin

(SaO u.s. 44; 1991). Decided in 1991, the

Court changed a preViously ambiguous decision concerning the
warrantless incarceration of suspects. While pointing out that the
Court did not like to set arbitrary time limits, the Court did just that,
ruling that suspects arrested without a warrant could be held no
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longer than forty-eight hours without a hearing on probable cause.
In doing so, the Court reasoned that only by doing what it wished to

avoid, set an arbitrary limit, could they ensure that jurisdictions
would be forced to end their unconstitutional detentions without
prolonged litigation. While it may not be quite correct to call the
trimester framework "arbitrary," as there are obvious reasons for its'
.

.

set-up (viability and health reasons), the fact that it goes further
than drawing a line makes it appear legislative in nature, rather than
judicial.
White in County of Riverside the Court seemingly put an end to
most of the litigation on the subject by making a ruling that was
open to little interpretation, the Court failed to do so in Roe, thus
opening a "can of worms" as far as abortion legislation and litigation
was concerned. The Court, though seemingly hoping to reach the
same end as in Riverside, an end to vastly time-consuming litigation,
instead brought upon itself a heap of cases probing the boundaries of
the "trimester framework." As a gUideline to state legislatures to
write abortion statutes that passed constitutional muster, the
"trimester framework" failed miserably, and the Court began hearing
case after case on state limits on the abortion choice.
The Court, in fmding the right to privacy and the right to
choose an abortion in the Constitution without a specific reference to
them, should be required to clarify those rights as much as possible, .
lest they become "secondary" to the rights which are specifically
written into the document. If the right to privacy is so vague, it is
easily argued that such a right is the mere folly of the Court and does
not actually exist. The Court should hold itself to stricter standards
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when defining the unenumerated rights in the Constitution.
Otherwise, those who disagree may be able to mount a strong
argument against them, in the process weakening the public
perception of the wisdom and justice supposedly inherent in our
highest court.
Roe has had plenty of detractors, in some cases rightfully so.

For all the intentions to settle the issue once and for all, Roe opened
up a huge can of worms in abortion litigation. The Court has had to'
rule over and over on similar statutes with a certain distinction that
separates It from the others. For instance, the Court has had to rule
on single-parent notification laws, and then had to rule on a dual
parent notification law. In the end, all that is left of Roe, after
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (112 S.

Ct. 2791; 1992), is that a woman retains the right to choose an
abortion and the state cannot intrude on that choice. Beyond that,
Casey is now the law of the land where most abortion statutes are

concerned. Whereas the right to choose may seem very broad,
indeed the state is only prohibited from taking that choice away. As
long as a statute does not infringe on the right to choose to have an
abortion, it now stands a better chance of passing constitutional
muster. In essence, the state may now place any restriction on the
right to choose which does not create an "undue burden." Of course,
the Court has not told us what such a burden would constitute, save
an all-out ban on abortions.
I will now examine, issue-by-issue, how the trimester

framework of Roe v. Wade spawned a generation's worth of
litigation, with little left to the original decision.
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Chapter 2-The Abortion Choice Issues Since Roe
A. State- and·Federal-Funding
The Supreme Court has heard a handful of cases concerning
the denial of state and federal funding for abortions. In all cases, the
Court has upheld bans on government-funded non-therapeutic
abortions, just as they would likely uphold a ban on government
funding for non-therapeutic plastic surgery. Although the resultant
mental heciI.th issues surrounding a patient in either case may be
vastly different (a child vs. a large nose, for instance), the Court has
never really paid much credence to issues of mental health in the
abortion debate.
The fIrst case the Court heard on abortion funding was Beal v.
Doe (1977). Beal determined that states were not required to fund

non-therapeutic abortions under Title XIX of the Social Security Act·
(Medicaid). States were given broad power to decide what would
and would not be funded and "[n]othing in the language of Title XIX
requires a participating State to fund every medical procedure falling
within the delineated categories of medical care" (Beal, 432 U.S. 438;
1977). Furthermore, the Court ruled that although a problem may
arise if necessary treatment was not funded, "it is not inconsistent
with the Act's goals to refuse to fund unnecessary... medical services"·
(Beal, 432 U.S. 438; 1977).

The second case before the Supreme Court addressing the
funding issue was Maher v. Roe, also decided in 1977. Connecticut
declined to use state Medicaid funds for abortion while state funds
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were used to finance childbirth. An action was brought challenging
this policy as a violation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court found Connecticut's policy to be
constitutional. According to the Court's reasoning, "[a]n indigent
woman desiring an abortion is not disadvantaged by Connecticut's
decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent
on private abortion services" (Maher, 432 U.S. 464; 1977). Although
this decision has been upheld, the reasoning here is very misleading~
While it is true that an indigent woman is not disadvantaged by the
decision to fund childbirth, she is disadvantaged by the decision not
to fund elective abortions. The real reason behind this decision lies
in the fact that the Court has not granted the indigent suspect
classification. A grant of suspect classification causes certain groups
to have a greater amount of weight on their side when they are
seemingly maligned. Hence, it is much easier to prove discrimination
against a group with suspect classification, as racial and religious
minorities have attained. Women and the indigent have not been
granted such classification. Accordingly, women and the poor are not
seen by the Court, as racial or religious minorities are, as a class that
deserves special legal protection. This circumstance, of course,
makes the abortion dilemma all the tougher for the majority of
women who seek abortions, the poor ones. Because neither women
nor the poor have suspect classification, the Equal Protection
challenge failed.
In Harris v. McRae (1980), the Court ruled on the

constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which withholds Title XIX
Medicaid funds from even those abortions deemed necessary. The
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Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, adding that a state is not
required to cover the costs of abortions not funded by federal
Medicaid funds.. Following the reasoning of Maher, the government
need not remove obstacles to abortion not of its own creation "and
indigency falls within [that] category" (Harris, 448 U.S. 297; 1980).
In other words, because the government did not make one poor and

pregnant, the government need not provide any aid to rectify the
situation. The government would, however, provide aid to a poor
woman with the flu or to a poor woman electing to give birth. In
other words, this is a political policy decision not to fund abortions
and has nothing to do with health-related issues. Legislatures argue
that the majority of the people do not wish their tax dollars to fund
abortions, however, the taxpayer has never had a choice as to what
his or her dollars went to. If this were the real reason behind such
legislation, there would be larger defense cuts and less money in
pickle research and the relationship between cattle and methane
production.
In 1989, the Court ruled in Webster v. Reproductive Health

Services that a state may deny its facilities, funds, and employees to

abortion services, except in an emergency where the woman's life is
threatened. According to the Court, "[t]he Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid" (Webster,
492 U.S. 490; 1989). This was seen as a logical extension of the
Maher ruling.

Finally, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Court upheld that "none
of the federal funds appropriated under the [Public Health Service]
Act's Title Xfor Family planning services 'shall be used in programs
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where abortion is a method of family planning'" (Rust, 500 U.S. 173;
1991) as per a directive issued by then-Health and Human Services
Secretary Louis Sullivan. Here again, the Court upheld a political
policy that had nothing to do with health issues, but only with the
fact that the Bush Administration was anti-choice. In a rare case,
this section of the Act is upheld because the Act's wording
concerning the power of the H.H.S. secretary is so ambiguous. The
directive of H.H.S. Secretary Louis Sullivan banning the use of funds'
could be construed as permissible under the broad language in the
construction of the Act. As the ban reached so far as to ban even
counseling, the decision became known as the "gag rule." The "gag
rule" was criticized by many as impinging free speech and
endangering the doctor-patient relationship. Not only would a doctor
at a federally-funded clinic be banned from answering his or her
patients questions about abortion, the doctor would be required to
give a prepared speech explaining the clinic's non-involvement in the
issue of abortion (speaking reams about the Bush Administration's
eagerness to tum away from anything "unsightly" and merely
pretend it doesn't exist; "Abortion?, we don't talk about that here").
Sullivan's directive was overturned by an executive order signed by
President Clinton early in his administration.
B.ParentalNotification/Consent
Early parental consent laws were generally struck down as too
harsh by a mid-1970's Court still somewhat liberal regarding the
abortion issue. However, as states, increasingly lenient, began
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writing their statutes with available judicial bypasses, the Court,
increasingly conservative, began to fmd them acceptable.
The fIrst case dealing with parental consent came from one of
the three states that have contributed the most to the Court's
abortion docket, Missouri (the other two being Pennsylvania and
Ohio). The Court, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth (1976), struck down Missouri's parental consent law which

required an unmarried woman under eighteen years of age to obtain
written parental consent prior to obtaining a fIrst trimester abortion.
The Court·had several problems with this statute. The Court ruled
here for the first time that a state may not "impose a blanket
parental consent requirement..." (Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; 1976).
Additionally, the Court found offensive to Roe v. Wade the fact that
the statute places new regulations on first trimester abortions,
something prohibited by Roe's trimester framework.
In Bellotti v. Baird (1979), the Court struck down a

Massachusetts parental consent law. In this case, the Massachusetts
statute required parentalconsent, yet provided for a judicial bypass
(Le. the Court may override the decision of the parent, or may grant
consent in the parent's place). However, the minor was still subject
to a third-party veto of her decision.
[I]f the superior court fmds that the minor is capable
of making... an informed and reasonable decision... the
court may refuse its consent on a finding that a parent's,
or its own, contrary decision is a better one (Bellotti
443 U.S. 622; 1979).
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Furthermore, the statute required an attempt at obtaining parental
consent prior to invoking the bypass procedure. The Court found this
to be a harsh measure in that it fails to take into account situations in
which such action would not be in the minor's best interests.
In 1981, the Court upheld its first parental notification law, but

this was based more upon the facts of the specific case rather than
the constitutionality of the statute. In H.I. v. Matheson, the Court
upheld a Utah law requiring a physician to notify, if possible, the
parents of a minor before performing an abortion on that minor. The
minor in this case, H.L., did not offer any evidence of maturity or
emancipation, and the Court as such found no reason to strike down
the statute on its face. Because of H.L.'s immaturity and dependence,
the statute was held to be reasonable as it applied to her and the
Court declined to rule as to whether that would be the case with a
mature or emancipated minor, as is standard procedure. The Court
will not offer rulings on facts not present in the case before it.
In 1983, the Court decided two parental consent cases. The

first was Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, now
referred to as "Akron 1." This case concerned an Akron, Ohio City
ordinance which required a minor under fIfteen years of age seeking
an abortion to receive either parental consent or a judicial bypass.
The Court stuck down the ordinance following its reasoning in
Danforth that the ordinance:

mak[es] a blanket determination that all minors under
the age of 15 are too immature to make an abortion
decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor's
best interests without parental approval (Akron I, 462
U.S. 416; 1983).
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Furthermore, the Court did not find that the Ohio Juvenile Court
operated in such a way as to promote the "opportunity for case-by
case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors" (Akron I, 462
U.S. 416; 1983). The Court apparently believed the O.J.C. to be run in
a way so as to streamline the judicial process, thereby sacrificing the
time needed to determine the maturity of the pregnant minors
before it.
The second 1983 case was Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, .
Mo. v. Ashcr(Jft. In Ashcroft, the statute challenged required that

minors obtain parental c.onsent or a judicial bypass. For the first
time, the Court found the parental consent statute constitutional as it
applied to a mature minor. The Court's reasoning, however, relies on
the assumption, noted by the Court, that the state may not impose a
parental veto on the decision to abort. This assumption being true,
the provision of the statute stands as there is no longer a roadblock
to a mature minor obtaining an abortion.
The first of two cases heard in 1990, Hodgson v. Minnesota
(497 U.S. 417), concerned a Minnesota consent law that required
notification of both parents. This was struck down for simply not
furthering any state interest not satisfied by single-parent
notification.
In 1990, the Court also decided Akron II, Ohio v. Akron Center

for Reproductive Health, the last case heard by the Court on this

issue. Challenged here was Ohio's House Bill 319 which requires:
...the physician provides timely notice to one of the
minor's parents or a juvenile court issues an order
authorizing the minor to consent. To obtain a judicial
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bypass of the notice requirement, the minor must present
clear and convincing proof that she has sufficient
maturity or that one of her parents has engaged in a
pattern of abuse against her... or that notice is not in
her best interests (emphasis added) (Akron IT, 497 u.s.
502; 1990).
The statute was upheld as it satisfied the four criteria set forth in

Bellotti (1979). First, the minor has the opportunity to prove
maturity to make the decision regardless of the wishes of her
parents. Second, the statute, unlike the one struck down in Bellotti,

.

requires the Court to consent if it is in the best interests of the minor.
Third, the bypass procedure virtually ensures the juvenile's
'.

anonymity. Finally, the bypass procedure would not cause a delay
that would cause greater risk to the minor.
C. Mandatory Waiting Periods
Some states have tried their hand at passing mandatory
waiting periods that a woman must comply with prior to procuring a
scheduled abortion. This is another policy attempt, analogous to the
"cooling off period" required before purchasing a handgun, that
states hope will cause pregnant women to reverse their decisions.
The policy is cloaked in the guise of giving the woman more time to
process "information" on the abortion procedure. Of course, it also
wreaks havoc on poor women who must travel a long distance to
procure an abortion only to be unable to afford an overnight trip to
satisfy the requirement. The Supreme Court has only heard three
cases concerning this type of provision. The first, Akron I, was
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struck down. But, Hodgson's and Casey's provisions were both
upheld.
In Akron I, the challenged Akron ordinance required a twenty

four hour waiting period after consent before a minor may procure
an abortion. The Court struck down the provision as not furthering
any state interest. The mandate was found "arbitrary and inflexible"
and the Court argued that the ordinance would neither cause the
procedure to be performed more safely, nor serve the state's concern
that the woman make an informed decision.
In Hodgson (1990).. however, the Court, while striking down the

two-parent notification, upheld Minnesota's requirement that a
minor be subjected to aforty-eight hour waiting period prior to
undergoing the abortion procedure, effectively overturning the
decision in Akron I. The Court merely "admitted" they made a
mistake, and that the waiting period may very well serve an interest
in prOViding for a more informed decision.
In Casey (1992), the Court upheld a twenty-four hour waiting

period for all women seeking an abortion. This case established
waiting period provisions for all women as constitutional. The effect,
once again felt by indigent women, is that some abortions may now
be "more expensive and less convenient," according to the Court,
apparently also deciding that that is not so bad an effect. Both here,
and in Hodgson, the Court modified its thinking, deciding that waiting
periods now did further the state's interest in making sure the
woman is making a well-informed decision.
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D. Informed Consent Laws

The motive behind informed consent laws is twofold. First, the
state wishes to ensure that certain information is given to a woman
about to have an abortion..The second, in the eyes of the Court in
early cases, was to intimidate the woman into not having an abortion.
Therefore, early versions of informed consent laws were struck
down, but the Court, in later decisions, has reversed that line of
thinking.
The first case to deal with informed consent was Danforth
(1976). Tl'iat case was brought as a challenge to a Missouri statute
which required a woman to consent in writing prior to receiving a
first trimester abortion.. Because this part of the statute was so
harmless, the Court let it stand, even though most of the rest of the
statute was struck down. This statute required only the signature
and did not require any specific dissemination of information.
The ordinance involved in Akron I (1983) was much stricter.
Here, it was required:
that the attending physician inform his patient of the
status of her,pregnancy, the development of her fetus,
the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional
complications that may result from an abortion, and the
availability of agencies to provide her with assistance
and information with respect to birth control, adoption,
and childbirth, and also inform her of the particular
risks associated with her pregnancy and the abortion
technique to be employed (Akron I, 462 U.S. 416; 1983).
The Court found this ordinance to be an unconstitutional
infringement on the discretion of the physician. "[A] State [does not
have] unreviewable authority to decide what information a woman
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must be given" (Akron I, 462 U.S. 416; 1983). (Although in Rust,
Secretary Sullivan apparently did). Furthermore, the Court found it
excessive that only a physician (and not some other, trained health
care provider) may give the patient this information.
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (1986), the Court struck down another informed

consent law as harsh as the one in Akron 1. Challenged was the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. The informed consent
provision required that:
[the patient] be informed of the name of the physician
who will perform the abortion, the "particular medical
risks" of the abortion procedure to be used and of
carrying her child to term, and the facts that there may
be "detrimental physical and psychological effects,"
medical assistance benefits may be available for
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, the father is
liable to assist in the child's support, and printed
materials are available from the state that describe the
fetus and list agencies offering alternatives to abortion;
[and] requires such printed materials to include a
statement that there are agencies willing to help the
mother carry·her child to term and to assist her after the
child is born and a description of the probable anatomical
and physiological characteristics of an unborn child at
"two-week gestational increments" (Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
747; 1986).
The Court viewed this statute as "intimidat[ing] women into
continuing pregnancies." Additionally, the Court ruled that the
printed materials "are nothing less than an attempt to wedge the
State's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician"
(Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747; 1986). Here, it is interesting to note the
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Court's inconsistencies. A much more liberal Court upheld the policy
decisions (that had no health-related value) to disallow statefunding for abortions, yet the much more conservative Court of 1986
struck down the policy decisions to disseminate information for

which a health-related value could be argued! This is a
phenomenal inconsistency that has yet to be explained in any logical,
legal manner, and can only be attributed to the forces of society and
politics.
However, in the Casey ruling of 1992 the Court reversed its
decisions concerning informed consent laws. In this case, the Court
upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring that the patient "be provided
with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is
performed" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). The Court's decision
rested on its overturning of the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade
and its establishment of the undue burden test (which actually began
to form in the Webster ruling of 1989, much to Antonin Scalia's
chagrin). According to the undue burden test, an undue burden
exists when a law's "purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). Following this new
standard, the Court disaffrrmed its previous holdings regarding
informed consent, and here ruled that infonned consent laws did not
create a substantial obstacle and so did not cause an undue burden
on a woman's choice to have an abortion. In fact, the Court even
rejected its past arguments against what it had labeled
"intimidation." "Measures designed to advance [informed consent]
should not be invalidated if their purpose is to persuade the woman
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to choose childbirth over abortion" (Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791; 1992).
The dissent in Casey, in concurring with the overturning of the
trimester framework, argues that the undue burden standard is no
better. The Court, instead of settling the issue, will now have to hear
case after case on what constitutes a "substantial" obstacle. "The
undue burden standard... ·has no basis in constitutionallaw and will
not result in the sort of simple limitation... which the opinion
anticipates... The standard presents nothing more workable than the
trimester framework" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). Whether or not
this will be the case remains to be seen. Since Casey, there has been
only one case before the Court dealing with the abortion choice. That
case, Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1992),
was not argued before the Court. The Court, by denying certiorari (a
petition to the Court to hear an appeal not in conflict among the
lesser courts), let the decision of the Ninth Circuit of the Court of
Appeals stand. That decision invalidated a Guam law outlawing all
abortions except in medical emergencies as unconstitutional on its
face.
Of course, proscribing all abortions is such a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice that that case is not one to look at to in
order to predict the future of undue burden tests.

E. Mandatory Procedures
Many states have adopted mandatory procedures that must be
followed in the procurement of an abortion. Examples include
reporting standards, fetal life preservation techniques, and where
the abortion must be performed. While most of these have been
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struck down, in light of Casey, this seems to be the area in which
most future litigation will arise.
The first case dealing with this issue was Roe's companion case,
Doe v. Bolton (1973). The Georgia law invalidated in Doe required

that the patient must be a Georgia resident, that the abortion must
be performed in a lCAH-accredited hospital, that the procedure must
be approved by a hospital committee set up to specifically approve
abortions, and that the physician's judgment must be concurred in by
two other doctors. The Court, understandably, found fault with all of
these requIrements. First, in one of the rare applications of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause'{a clause requiring one state to
treat those of another state in the same manner) of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court struck down the resident requirement as
unconstitutional. Second, the Court ruled that not only does the
procedure not have to take place in a lCAH-accredited hospital, but it
does not even need to take place in any hospital. In what seems an
early version of the undue burden standard (albeit, a liberal one),
the Court rejected the argument that such a requirement was shown
by the state to further its interest in protecting maternal health.
Third, the interposition of the committee is "unduly restrictive of the
patient's rights" (Doe, 410 U.S. 179; 1973). Finally, the Court found
that the concurrence of two other doctors "has no rational connection
with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on her physician's right
to practice" (Doe, 410 U.S. 179; 1973).
In 1975, the Court heard Connecticut v. Menillo. The Court

upheld a Connecticut law which criminalized the abortion procedure
as performed by non-physicians. As this was the only restriction
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that the Court ruled that the state may place on first trimester
abortions in Roe, there was nothing to keep Connecticut from passing
such a statute.
In Danforth (1976), the Court struck down the part of the

Missouri statute which required the physician performing the
abortion to take steps to preserve the fetus, subject to prosecution
for manslaughter. Here, the Court seemed to reason in a roundabout
manner. Where the first part of the provision (that the physician
attempt to pl"eserve the life of the fetus) is deemed impermissible
regardless· of the stage of pregnancy, the second part (providing
criminal and civil sanctions) is struck down as being inextricably tied
to the first. The statute in Danforth also called for reporting and
recordkeeping by health facilities and doctors providing abortions.
The Court upheld this provision provided that the anonymity of the
patient is preserved. Finally, the statute outlawed the use of the
amniocentesis procedure to induce abortion. The Court struck down
this provision which outlawed what was, at the time, the safest and
most widely used technique in the nation. Furthermore, it was the
technique used for most second trimester abortions. "As an arbitrary
regulation designed to prevent the vast majority of abortions after
the fIrst twelve weeks, it is plainly unconstitutional" (Danforth, 428
U.S. 52; 1976).
In Colautti v. Franklin (1979), the Court struck down portions

of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required physicians
to determine fetal viability, if possible, and to try to preserve the life
of the fetus, subject to criminal prosecution. The viability
determination requirement was struck down for its ambiguity. "The
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intended distinction between "is viable" and "may be viable" is
elusive" (Colautti, 439 U.S. 379; 1979). Likewise, the Court struck
down the preservation requirement for the same reason. "It is
uncertain whether the statute permits the physician to consider his
duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus"
(Colautti, 439 U.S. 379; 1979).

The Court heard three cases on these issues in 1983. The first
case, Akron I (1983), saw the Court strike down two more parts of
the Akron ordinance concerning this issue. First, the ordinance
required that all post-fIrst trimester abortions be obtained in a
hospital. The Court rejected this-portion as Akron presented no
evidence that it was tailoring its ordinance in such a way as to be a
"reasonable effort" to limit its effect on women seeking abortions
(again, an apparent early incarnation of the undue burden test). The
Court's argument here was that, although the state's interest in
maternal health becomes compelling after the fIrst trimester, the
abortion procedure is still reasonably safe throughout the greater
portion of the second trimester so as to render this part of the
ordinance as unreasonable for the vast majority of the second
trimester. The second part struck down required that physicians
"ensure that fetal remains are disposed of in a 'humane and sanitary
manner'" (Akron 1,462 U.S. 416; 1983). Although this appears to be
a reasonable requirement (though maybe more suited for
environmental control), the time of the Akron I decision appears to
be at the height of the Court's liberalness regarding its protection of
abortion and related issues as is evidenced here. The Court struck
down this provision as "violat[ing] the Due Process Clause by failing
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to give a physician fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden" (Akron 1,462 U.S. 416; 1983).
The second of three 1983 cases heard on these issues was
Ashcroft. Citing Akron I, the Court struck down the part of the

Missouri statute requiring that all post-first trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital. However, the Court upheld two other
provisions. First, that a pathology report be prepared for each
aborted fetus was approved as it entails a small additional cost and
"does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision"
(once again, a glimpse of undue burden) (Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476;
1983). Second, the Court upheld the requirement that a second
physician be in attenciahce for a post-viability abortion. The Court
argued that this provision furthered the state interest in viable fetal
life, even though it does not require an attempt to preserve the life
of the fetus. It appears to be unclear, then, how a second physician
will further the fetus's benefit if there is no required attempt to

preserve it. Perhaps, there is no detriment, but there does not
appear to be any benefit.
The last 1983 case was Simopoulos v. Virginia. Here, a
physician was convicted for inducing an abortion at his unlicensed
clinic. Although the conviction was affirmed by the Court, the Court
reaffIrmed its decisions in Akron I and Ashcroft that all second
trimester abortions need not be performed in a hospital. The
Virginia law, in fact, required that clinics performing second
trimester abortions be licensed, a regulation that the Court deemed
as not unreasonable in furthering the state's interest in maternal
health.
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Finally, in Thornburgh (1986), the Court affirmed its decisions
in Danforth and Colautti that it is unconstitutional to require
physicians to attempt to preserve the life of aborted viable fetuses.
Here, however, the Court seemingly implies that such a requirement
could pass constitutional muster if constructed correctly. "Section
3210(c), by failing to provide a medical-emergency exception... chills
the performance of a late abortion, which, more than one performed
at an earlier date, tends to be under emergency conditions"
(Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747). In other words, most late abortions are

of an emergency nature. Because the statute requires attempted
fetal preservation in all cases and not just those that are not
emergencies, the portion of the statute cannot stand.
F. Miscellaneous Provisions
There are, of course, certain statutes that will not conform to
any of the previous headings. That fact will not allow them to escape
my attention.
In two Missouri cases, Danforth (1976) and Webster (1989),

statutory preambles (non-operative clauses of the statutes) were
challenged. In Danforth, the state defined "viability" as "that stage of
fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be
continued indefmitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life
supportive systems" (Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; 1976). The Court upheld
this defmition of viability as consistent with its findings in Roe.
In Webster, the Court threw out the challenge to the statutory

preamble as it had no activating powers, and therefore, could in no
way inhibit any right. That preamble "sets forth 'fmdings' that... 'the
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life of each human being begins at conception,' and that 'unborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being,'"
(Webster, 492 U.S. 490; 1989).

The Court has also twice struck down spousal consent laws.
First, in Danforth (1976), and finally, in Casey (1992). In Danforth,
the Missouri statute at issue required spousal consent for a first
trimester abortion. The Court, recognizing the lack of state authority
to regulate a fIrst trimester abortion ruled that "the State cannot
'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the [S] tate itself is
absolutely" and totally prohibited from exercising...'" (Danforth, 428
U.S. 52; 1976).
Finally, in Casey, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania's spousal
notification requirement is unconstitutional. Here, the Court finds
that such a notification constitutes an undue burden on the choice to
abort. "A significant number of women will likely be prevented from
obtaining an abortion just as surely as if Pennsylvania had outlawed
the procedure entirely" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992).
Conclusion-Part·J
The opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) has
established the constitutionality of most of the preceding issues.
First, the central holding of Roe v. Wade, that a woman has a
constitutional right to choose to have an abortion, was reaffrrmed. IIi
addition, strong informed consent laws were upheld, as were waiting
periods, parental notification (with a judicial bypass), and reporting
procedures. The Court's option not to hear Ada also reaffirmed Roe's
central holding. The right to choose an abortion is apparently safe
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for a long time. The scope of the Casey decision remains to be seen,
however. Just as states were willing to test the limits of the
trimester framework, they are likely just as willing, if not more so, to
see what they can get away with under the eyes of the undue
burden standard. Clearly, it seems that obstacles to abortion will no
longer be held to such a strict scrutiny as the one they were under
the trimester framework. The undue burden test, as it appears in
Webster and Casey, is a much more lenient tool.

The undue burden test is much more grounded in judicial
precedent °than the trimester framework was. Whereas the trimester
framework had the appearance of legislating, the undue burden test
has the appearance of any number of "tests" the Court has
manufactured over the years to reach decisions on various subjects.
Unfortunately, as a test, the undue burden test accomplishes little in
both expediency and straightforwardness. The ambiguity of the
undue burden test will cause many state legislatures to wonder what
will pass the test and what will not. Many states will undoubtedly

attempt to make their abortion control laws just a little bit tougher
than Pennsylvania's, and maybe they'll get away with it. More than
a few times, even in Roe's companion case, undue burden seemed to
rear its head before it wholeheartedly superseded the trimester
framework in Webster and Casey.
Twenty years after Roe, the choice remains. Perhaps it will not
take another twenty years to see how Casey will affect that choice. I
concur in the judgment of Casey's dissenters that there will be much
tougher cases ahead where the imaginary line delineating what
constitutes an undue burden and what doesn't will be extremely
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blurry. How could there not be? There are two ways, neither of
them likely. The fIrst is that each state will model its abortion
control statutes after Pennsylvania's and will not test the waters as
they did with the trimester.framework. That is extremely unlikely.
Equally unlikely is that the Supreme Court will be wholeheartedly
satisfied with the decisions of the lower courts and that no two
jurisdictions will come into conflict with each other, thereby ensuring
that no case on abortion regulation ever again comes be fore the
Court. That will not happen, either.
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Part ll-The Right to Clinic Access
Chapter 3-Access Denied: The Failure of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871
Here we delve into a different aspect of abortion, not the
government's regulations and the politics of choice, but the
government's obligation to prevent non-governmental forces from
removing that choice.
Although the harassment suffered by abortion service
providers and their patients is nothing new, the question of how to
combat the nationwide tactics of ,groups like Operation Rescue in our
overburdened courts is. Since the volatile Wichita summer of 1991,
the nation has been engaged in debate over the rights of women
seeking an abortion versus the rights of prO-life groups to engage in
free speech. The lower federal courts have been swamped with
cases. The Supreme Court has already decided two cases on the
subject. At issue is whether the blockade tactics of the pro-life
forces are a constitutional invocation of free speech rights, or
whether they constitute, among other things, extortion.
In 1991, in Wichita, Kansas, violent abortion clinic blockades

took place. With the local police force unable to keep the clinics
open, U.S. District Court Judge Patrick Kelly imposed numerous
restraining orders and injunctions against Operation Rescue. Kelly
also called out the U.S. Marshal Service to aid the local police. With
thousands of protesters being arres'ted for contempt in violation of
the injunctions, the actions of Judge Kelly seemed fruitless.
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In fact, in more than thirteen instances since 1989, lower

federal courts have placed injunctions on Operation Rescue and
similar organizations, forbidding them from denying access to
abortion clinics. Eight of these injunctions had been based on the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also known as the "K.K.K. Act"). In order to
support an injunction based on the Act, there must be a showing of
"class-based animus." In other words, there must be an invidious
discrimination found with that discrimination coming as the result of
one's belonging to a certain class, such as being a female. Operation
Rescue ha~ contended that no such animus exists. Their contention is
rather that only women seeking abortions are targeted, and that is
not a class protected under Section 1985(3) (the section of the Act
providing relief).
Judge Kelly, and many other federal judges in other
jurisdictions, found that:
[t]he blocking of entry into the clinics is not the goal, but
the means by which the defendants seek to obtain their
goal. That goal is the elimination of the right to obtain
an abortion. Necessarily, that goal infringes on the
rights of women, and the rights of women only. The
patients of the plaintiffs herein form a gender-based
class supporting the application of Section 1985(3)
( Women's Health Care Services, et al. v. Operation Rescue
National, et al., 773 F. Supp. 265; 1991).
In making this fmding, Judge Kelly proceeded to the next

requirement to make a claim under Section 1985(3).
The plaintiffs in Wichita, and elsewhere, needed to prove a
violation of their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment
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of the Constitution. However, such a violation must come about as a
result of state action, meaning the state must play some role in
denying that right. In Great Am. Fed. Save & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny
(442 U.S. 366; 1979), Judge Kelly found the basis for this claim:
private action which inhibits or thwarts the ability of
the state to guarantee equal protection may cause the
state either unwillingly or unwittingly to further the
ends of the conspiracy. 'If private persons take
conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the
cQnstituted authorities from giving or securing equal
treatment, the private persons would cause those
. authorities to violate the 14th amendment; the private
persons would then have violated Section 1985(3)'
(Women's Health Care Services, 773 F. Supp. 265; 1991).
Finding Operation Rescue, et ale now in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Judge Kelly reviewed the 1871 Act's right to travel
provision.
Here, the plaintiffs need not demonstrate state action; the mere
evidence of private conspiracy to prevent interstate travel of citizens
is sufficient. Operation Rescue argued that because it interfered with
the rights of all persons seeking clinic access, and not just those
travelling from out-of-stine, the claim fails. Judge Kelly threw out
that line of reasoning as ludicrous countering "the defendants may
not escape liability... by the mere expediency of enlarging the scope
of their conspiracy to include local victims as well" (W.H.C.S., 773 F.
Supp. 267; 1991).
Finally, the plaintiffs must prove that injunctive relief (relief
that ends or preempts the action causing harm) is an available
remedy under Section 1985(3). Operation Rescue argued that only
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monetary relief is possible, but Judge Kelly disagreed. "None of the
arguments advanced by Operation Rescue compels the conclusion
that injunctive relief, although not expressly provided under Section
1985(3), may not be granted where money damages would be
inadequate" (W.H.C.S., 773 F. Supp. 267; 1991). Furthermore,
according to Judge Kelly, "...the primarily remedial purpose of the
statute [is not] a bar to the granting of injunctive relief' (W.H.C.S.,
773 F. Supp. 267; 1991). Or, because the statute is written primarily
to provide relief for harm already established, that does not dismiss
the opportunity to act to prevent further harm.
Section 1985(3) claims have been upheld in New York State
N.O. W., et al. v. Terry, et al. (u.S. Ct. of App.l2nd Circ.-886 F. 2d
1339); N.O. W., et al. v. Operation Rescue, et al. (U.S. Dist. Ct.lE. Dist. of

Va.-726 F. Supp. 1483); Cousins, M.D., et al. v., Terry, et ale (U.S. Dist.
Ct.lN. Dist. of N.Y.-721 F. Supp. 426); Roe, et ale v. Operation Rescue, et
ale (U.S. Dist. Ct.lE. Dist. of Pa.-710 F. Supp. 577: affirmed by 3rd Circ.

919 F.2d 857); N.O.It:, et al. v. Operation Rescue, et ale (U.S. Dist.
Ct.lD.Columbia-747 F. Supp. 772); and Women's Health Care Services,
et al. v. Operation Rescue-National, et ale (U.S. Dist. Ct.lDist. of Kan.

1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14521).
Regardless of Section 1985(3) claims, the plaintiffs in all of the
blockade cases have presented state claims (claims based on the civil
and criminal laws of the state in which the harm took place), as well.
The state claims encompass the tortious acts of trespass, interference
with business relations, and public and private nuisance. Almost
every jurisdiction faced with these cases have upheld the use of
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injunctive relief based on state claims if the Supreme Court
overruled the use of Section 1985(3) to combat the problem.
As it turned out, the Supreme Court did just that. In the 1993
case Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, the Court held that
Section 1985(3) "does not provide a federal cause of action against
persons obstructing access to abortion clinics" (Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753;
1993). The Court fIrst ruled that a class-based animus was not
present to support a Section 1985(3) claim.
Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion
. qualifies alongside race discrimination as an 'otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
[underlYing] the conspirators' action...' the 'animus'
requirement demands at least a purpose that focuses
upon women by reason of their sex,... Opposition to
abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect sex
b~sed intent (Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753; 1993).
The Court also found that the plaintiffs failed to prove a
disparagement of their right to travel. .
Although the right to interstate travel is
constitutionally protected against private interference
in at least some contexts, Carpenters makes clear that a
Section 1985(3) private conspiracy must be 'aimed at'
that right... [defendants] proposed demonstrations would
erect 'actual barriers to... movement' only intrastate
(Zobel v. Williams via Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753; 1993).
This defeat of the use of Section 1985 (3) of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act did not vacate the injunctions. It only forced them to be upheld
on the state claims, rather than on Section 1985(3). However, it also
vacated the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs, because those fees
were awarded via Section 1988 of the same Act. The state claims did
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not allow those fees to be awarded in most cases. (A further case
could be made that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to
hear those state claims because the federal claims under Section
1985(3) failed. The Court dismissed that argument. For the District
Court to have no jurisdiction on the state claims, the federal claims
would have to be "whollyinsubstantial and frivolous" (Bell v. Hood,
via Bray). As this was not the case, the District Courts retained
jurisdiction on the state law claims.

•
37

Chapter 4-Access Envisioned: The Victory? of RICO
Because the main motive of challenging the blockades under
Section 1985(3) was to hurt Operation Rescue, et ale monetarily
(jailing them for contempt had no effect), attorneys for pro-choice
groups searched for a new weapon. That weapon is the RICO
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) provision of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. RICO has both civil and
criminal p·rovisions and was enacted primarily as a weapon against
organized crime. Here, it is put t<> a new test.
RICO is a formidable weapon as it awards treble damages in
civil suits. The use of RICO against clinic blockades has been upheld
by the 2nd arid 3rd Circuit Courts of Appeal. However, in N.D. W. v.
Scheidler (968 F. 2d 612), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled

that civil RICO could not be wielded for lack of an economic motive·
on behalf of those participating in the blockade. The Supreme Court
heard N.D. ~ v. Scheidler on appeal on December 8,1993.
In arguing for applying RICO to Operation Rescue, et al., N.O.W.
argued that RICO was violated because:
the donations they receive from supporters is derived
from their racketeering activity. The racketeering
activity is extortion under the Hobbs Act... directed at
health centers, center employees, and patients...'it is
well known that the more outrageous and highly
publicized the activities are, the more likely the RICO
Defendants and the enterprises are to receive larger
donations' (N.D.~ v. Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 623; 1993).
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The District Court and the Seventh Circuit found this argument
unpersuasive. Instead, the courts ruled that the money was not
derived from racketeering activities. "The attenuated causal
connection between the defendants' criminal trespass, threats, and
vandalism, and their receipt of donations from third parties... is not
sufficient" to support a civil RICO claim (Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 625;
1993). As a result, the courts refused to grant that N.O.W. had
established economic motive and dismissed the cause.
It appeared likely that the Supreme Court would also rule
against N.b.W. in this matter. Although two Circuits had allowed the
RICO claim, the Court has ruled in past opinions that, regardless of
the broad language in RICO, the Court was reluctant to let RICO
become a federal tort law. However, the Court did deny certiorari to
Northeast Women's Center Inc. v. McMonagle.(868 F.2d 1342; 1993)

which upheld the RICO claim on the Hobbs' Act violation without a
further finding of economic motive. The Court's reason, therefore, for
granting certiorari to this case seemed, obviously, either to deny the
RICO claim based on the findings of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, or to uphold the claim based on McMonagle. Because the
Court erred somewhat in not hearing McMonagle (the Court usually
hears cases when lower Appellate Courts are in conflict), it seemed
that the Court would take the stand that RICO does not provide relief
in this case.
As further support for that stance, the Court will generally
defer to Congress when deciding whether or not to offer a remedy.
If Congress has acted in some way on an issue, the Court will

generally not act contrary to Congress. In mid-November, 1993, both
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houses of Congress passed legislation making it a federal crime to
violently obstruct an abortion service facility. As that remedy will
be available in the near future, the Court, following its own examples,
would likely not grant N.O.W. the civil RICO claim it asked.
Although it is not clear that the new legislation will offer any
more of a remedy than state claims do, the Court, likely, would
recognize Congress's explicit intent in passing the new legislation,
and, therefore would not apply RICO in a situation where it was not
explicitly intended by Congress.
On January 24, 1994, the Court surprised many.
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler (114 S. Ct. 798;

1994), the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals (in Chicago) which dismisseq N.O.W.'s civil RICO
claims for lack of an economic motive on the part of PLAN (the Pro
life Action Network, a league of anti-abortion groups including
Joseph Scheidler). The Court held that the dismissal was in error and
that the language of RICO was broad enough for such a claim to be
made. This ruling did not award damages to N.O.W. This ruling
merely holds that civil RICO claims may be filed without the need for
an economic motive on behalf of the wrongdoers.
There were many strong arguments on both sides of this issue.
The one that may be most important, relating to First Amendment
rights, was not entertained by the Court.
First, the intent of PLAN was not in doubt. In Joseph
Scheidler's own words, from his congressional testimony, the aims of
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PIAN were lito shut down the clinics and persuade women not to
have abortions" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994).
N.O.W.'s argument was that PLAN was a "nationwide conspiracy
to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering
activity including extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act" (Scheidler,
114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). These claims appear reasonable, although
PLAN would probably object to the terms "racketeering" and
"extortion." According to N.O.W., the extortion ("the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear...") on the part of PLAN
took the form of conspiring to use force, violence and/or fear to keep
clinic employees and physicians from their jobs, to "give up their
economic right to practice medicine," and for patients to give up their
right to receive treatment at the clinics.
The District Court dismissed the case citing Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 U.S. 127;

1961): the activities alleged "involved political opponents, not
commercial competitors, and political objectives, not marketplace
goals." The District Court and Appellate Court also dismissed based
on the lack of PLAN's economic motive. It is on this point that the
Supreme Court's reading of RICO and that of the lower courts'
differed enormously.
RICO, in section 1962(a), provides that:
it 'shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity... to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of

•
41
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce' (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798).
likewise, section 1962(b) of RICO states that:
it 'shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an
, unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce' (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798).
In sections 1962(a) and 1962(b),.the "enterprise" referred to is the

victim acquired through the racketeering activity. Here, the term
"enterprise" connotes a profit-seeking vehicle and it is this
connotation tl;lat the lower courts used in determining that PIAN did
not have an economic motive. The courts ruled that PLAN, through
its activities, was not seeking to gain control of any profit-seeking
enterprise, hence, PLAN had no economic motive.
The Supreme Court, however, relied on the connotation of the
term "enterprise" as it was used in section 1962(c) of RICO
In section 1962(c), RICO makes it illegal:

'for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in , or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt' (Scheidler, 114 S.
Ct. 798; 1994).

•
42
It is in this section that the Court finds a different connotation of the
word "enterprise," one that allows the Court to drop the economic
motive requirement.
According to the Court, "[a]rguably an enterprise engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit-seeking motive,
but the language in [section] 1962(c) does not stop there; it includes
enterprises whose activities 'affect' interstate or foreign commerce"
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). Therefore, the connotation of

"enterprise" ·in this section makes it the vehicle through which the
harm is done. According to this section, PLAN would be the
enterprise ,,:,hich 11 affects interstate or foreign commerce" through
racketeering activities, provided those activities could be proven.
Using this argument, there need not be an economic motive for
PLAN, they need only be affecting the interstate commerce of the
clinics through extortion or other means. Other such means which
fall within the scope of RICO include any threats involVing murder, .
arson, obstruction of justice, obstruction of State or local law
enforcement, interference with commerce, etc. Those are the
examples which PLAN could be linked to in future cases. RICO is
much broader, however, adding bribery, mail fraud, gambling,
tampering, obscene material and other activities.
The Court did not simply tie the argument up at that point,
however. Everything does not fall into place that quickly. The Court
of Appeals, following the example of the Supreme Court in Sedima v.
Imrex(473 U.S. 479; 1985) believed that the connotation of

"enterprise" as it appeared in sections 1962(a) and (b) should also
apply to (c) to restrict the breadth of RICO to that for which it was
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apparently intended, to be a weapon against organized crime. In
Sedima, the term "violation" seemed to have differing connotations in

adjacent sections of the same statute passed by Congress. The Court
ruled that "we should not lightly infer that Congress intended the
term to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections"
(Sedima, 473 U.S. 479; 1985). The Court of Appeals took that to

mean that they should not infer the term "enterprise" to have a
wholly different meaning in section 1962(c) than it does in 1962(a)
and (b). According to the Supreme Court, however, "'enterprise'...
plays a different role in the structure of those subsections than it
does in subsection (c)" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). Because in
subsections (a) and (b) the enterprise is the victim of the
racketeering activity and in subsection (c) it is the vehicle for the
racketeering, the Court argues that it is almost necessary to have a
wholly different meaning.
Consequently, since the enterprise in subsection (c) is
not bei..~g acquired, it need not have a property interest
that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging
in illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact
that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Nothing in subsections (a) and (b) directs us to a
contrary conclusion (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994).
Hence, PlAN does not require an economic motive to be found liable
in a civil RICO suit. PlAN need only be found to be engaging in a
pattern of racketeering activity that is affecting interstate or foreign
commerce through any of the aforementioned means (Le. extortion).
There were yet more arguments for the economic motive
requirement for the Court to sift through, however. One concerned
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the Appellate Court case U.S. v. Bagaric (706 F.2d 42; 1983). In this
case, a civil RICO suit against a political terrorist group was dismissed
for lack of an economic motive. The basis for the dismissal was
partly the congressional statement of fmdings prefacing RICO and
referring to the activities of groups that "drain billions of dollars
from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud and corruption" (Bagaric, 706 F.2d, at 57). The Appellate
Court used this statement as one basis for the economic motive
requirement..
The Supreme Court countered, arguing "[w]e... think that the
quoted statement of congressional fmdings is a rather thin reed upon
which to base a requirement of economic motive neither expressed
nor, we think, fairly implied..." (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994).
The Court has often expressed its desire to interpret statutes
with the intentions of Congress in mind. Here, the Court calls the
congressional findings a "rather thin reed," yet the Court has no reed
at all that shows Congress's intention to wield RICO as broadly as the
Court wishes to now. In essence, because the Court does not have

enough evidence for the intentions of Congress to have an economic
motive requirement, they will follow the route for which they have

no evidence, only the lack of proof for the contrary. That is quite a
circular argument that the Court has spun. In other words, the lack
of evidence for Congress's intentions not to have an economic motive
requirement is the fact that they have little evidence that Congress
intended for there to be an economic motive requirement. Disregard
the fact that there is no positive evidence for no economic motive
requirement. In this case, for the Court, less is more. The less
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Congress has said, the more the Court can mold it. And, "Thank God,"
said the Court, "the only thing Congress said were in the 'findings'."
Instead, it seems likely that the Court felt "compelled" to reach such
a decision. It is unlikely for Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist (who wrote the decision) to endorse anything
that may appear to support the right to abort. That would explain
the failure of the 1871 Civil Rights Act to work in the Bray decision.
Rather, the Court relied specifically on the language in RICO and
disregarded what the facts of the case were. The Scheidler decision
was a theoretically-based, and not a reality-based, decision. In other
words, the facts of the case were not of paramount importance in
Scheidler. The Court merely ruled on whether a RICO claim include

proof of economic motive. It did not matter to the Court that the
defendants were pro-life.
Finally, the Court declined to entertain constitutional
arguments on this subject because they did not pertain to RICO as it
was argued before the Court in this case. PLAN argued that their
actions were protected by the First Amendment's rights to speech
and assembly (although anyone watching the news has seen that
these "assemblies" are anything but peaceful). However, since none
of the arguments presented by PLAN questioned the constitutionality
of RICO's construction, they were a moot point in this matter. One
can be sure, however, that such arguments will emerge the very next
time that PLAN is sued under the ambit of civil RICO.
The following will probably occur. An abortion rights group
will sue a group of clinic blockaders under civil RICO. The pro-life
group will move to dismiss, arguing that the present construction and
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interpretation of section 1962(c) of RICO unconstitutionally infringes
on their First Amendment rights to speak and peaceably assemble.
This will likely occur in more than one jurisdiction. It is also likely
that one District or Appellate Court will dismiss the suit, fmding that
the pro-life group's argument holds water (just as the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found PLAN to be a political group and not an
enterprise under RICO). It is further likely that another District or
Appellate Court will find in favor of the clinic. The Court, having
lower courts issuing conflicting rulings, will now have an increasingly
tougher nut to crack as the issue of First Amendment freedoms
becomes a part of the civil RICO equation.
The Court, in the past, has issued rulings in cases contrary to
what they may have preferred, in order to keep these constitutional
questions from arising. One such case, noted in Justice Souter's
concurrence in Scheidler (in which he discussed the First
Amendment issue), was the aforementioned Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 u.S. 127;

1961). In this case, the Court held that "antitrust laws do not apply
to businesses combining to lobby... even where such conduct has an
anticompetitive effect... because the alternative 'would raise
important constitutional questions' under the First Amendment"
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring).

The Court also stated in Lucas v. Alexander (279 U.S. 573;
1929) that a law "'must be construed with an eye to possible
constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its validity'"
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring). Justice Souter

claims that these two cases do not apply to RICO because they only·
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matter "when the meaning of a statute is in doubt... and here 'the
statutory language is unambiguous'" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.; 1994, J.
Souter, concurring).
In fact, Justice Souter uses some important civil rights cases as

examples for why an economic motive requirement is unnecessary.
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware (458 U.S. 886; 1982), the Court

held that boycotts do not fall under the state common law crime of
malicious interference with business. And in N.A.A.C.P. V. Alabama
(357 U.S.

44~;

1958), the Court ruled against Alabama's attempt at

compelling the N.A.A.C.P. to tum over its membership list.
Finally, in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla (944 F.2d
531; 1991), an Appellate Court afforded the respondent with a
heightened pleading standard for the complaint was based
on"presumptlvely protected First Amendment conduct" (Scheidler,
114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring).

Conclusion-Part II
likely, almost all civil RICO suits against PLAN will have PLAN
claiming their actions to be constitutionally protected speech. This
will not make it easy for N.O.W. or some other appellant to make

their case, as they will have to overcome stricter standards of
scrutiny to show why the actions of PLAN should no longer be
protected by the First Amendment. As I stated earlier, there is
almost certainty that separate circuits in our Appellate Court system
will reach disparate conclusions. As such, the Supreme Court will

have a touchier subject matter to deal with as is almost always the·
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case when the Bill of Rights is involved. The abortion cases have
shown us that.

As it becomes increasingly clear that both the rights of
pregnant women and the rights of abortion opponents need to be
protected, it must also be recognized that the tactics of those
involved in the pro-life movement have not always been legal.
Many in the pro-life movement have drawn the comparison to the
civil rights movement, but such

acomparison appears to me to be

fallacious. The movement for civil rights was sanctioned by the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection laws, which were passed
specifically to afford nonwhites the same rights as other (Plessey v.
Ferguson notwithstanding). The Fourteenth Amendment does not

confer those rights on the unborn, and "person" as used in the
Constitution has never been interpreted to include· the fetus. And
the hypocrisy of those who will profess the value of life and then kill
in the name of it is beyond any defInition of "civil disobedience."
The politics of the abortion issue, likewise have and will
continue to play an important role in the future of abortion litigation
and legislation. Since Roe v. Wade, the politics of the Court, of the
Congress, of the President, and of the state legislatures have shared
more or less equal parts in the shaping of abortion law. In addition,
the politics and social mores of the American people have directly
influenced the politics of the aforementioned. It is unlikely that a
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pro-life Democrat will ever be elected president, at least in the near
future, although a pro-choice Republican may have a shot.
Indeed, the conservative Rehnquist Court seemed to follow the
policy decisions of the Reagan ahd Bush Administrations that largely
shaped the Court in the Eighties. The "gag rule" and the Webster
decisions are plain indications of that. Is the Court now influenced
by the pro-choice politics of the Clinton Administration, however?
The RICO decision may be an indication that the politics of the sitting
president may have some influence over the Court at least where
issues of societal import are concerned. On the other hand, the
wisdom of the Court can not be overlooked when it came into
indirect conflict with the wishes of the president.
Depending on the poll, it is apparent that a slight majority of
the American people support the right to choose an abortion,
however, even as that support has risen or fallen since the Roe
decision, the Court has remained consistent in its inconsistency to
fully support or abandon its belief in that right. The Court has
moved from liberal (Roe, 1973) to conservative (Maher, 1977) to
liberal (Thornburgh, 1986) to conservative (Webster, 1989) to liberal
(Scheidler,1994). The opinion of America has not been so wishy

washy. At least where abortion is concerned, the societal mores of
America have seemed to affect the Court only to the point of keeping
the choice available and not much further beyond that.
The Supreme Court may never be silent on the issue of
abortion. As the Court left still more questions unanswered after
Casey and Scheidler, we can only watch as the debate over abortion

continues for another generation. Although I was pleasantly

•

so
surprised at the ruling in Scheidler (and completely oveIWhelmed by
the fact that it was a unanimous decision), I can't help but think that
it merely opened another can of worms. Unless the constitutional

problem is solved quickly (and quickly in our judicial system may be
seven-to-ten years), the weapon of civil RICO may never find its
mark. And, meanwhile, we wonder if America will ever draw
closure on this subject.

•
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